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REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIVISION'S ERRONEOUS "STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS" 
BEGS THE QUESTION OF THIS ENTIRE APPEAL 
The Division's "Statement of Relevant Facts" (Opp. Brief, pp. 4-5) contains several 
misstatements of fact, each of which beg the question of this entire appeal. 
First, the Division contends that it "notified the corporation by letter dated August 14, 
1990, that its corporate status would be suspended if [an] annual report was not filed within 
30 days." Opp. Brief, p. 4. This is not true. There is no evidence in the record or otherwise 
that supports this or any similar statement. Next, the Division states that Bio-Thrust was 
"advised by letter of September 12, 1990, that its status would be administratively dissolved 
if its default was not corrected within 120 days." Opp. Brief, p. 4. This too is not true. 
There is no evidence in the record supporting this or any similar statement. Third, the 
Division contends that Bio-Thrust was "advised of the dissolution by letter of January 7, 
1991." Opp. Brief, pp. 4-5. This third statement is likewise untrue. No evidence in the 
record exists to support this or any similar statement. 
Further on, the Division states that, after Appellant Coombs had petitioned for 
reinstatement, the Director of the Division "denied reinstatement on August 16, 2001, on the 
basis of computer printouts indicating mailings to the corporation's registered agent and 
president on the dates indicated above." Opp. Brief, p. 5. While this may be an accurate 
statement of Director Berg's conduct, this again mischaracterizes the facts and the record. The 
subject computer printouts, copies of which Bio-Thrust and Coombs have attached to their 
principal brief on appeal, do not "indicate" anything about any "mailings" of anything to 
anybody. The words "mail" or "mailing" are nowhere to be seen in any of such computer 
printouts. Instead, the printouts use the words "Run Date," which common sense dictates 
means that such was the date the computer printout itself was generated. Because they have 
nothing else to rely on to justify their conduct, the Division conveniently interprets the words 
"Run Date" to mean a "mailing" on the various dates indicated in the computer printouts. 
The fact is that there is not one shred of evidence in the record or otherwise to indicate that 
"Run Date" means the date that a certain notice was sent to someone, let alone what that 
notice contained or stated, not to mention the fact that any alleged notice, even if it did exist, 
did or didn't contain the kinds of enclosures required by the dissolution statute. In short, there 
can be little dispute that the Division did NOT comply with the dissolution statute. 
Because the Division's opposition presupposes the existence of facts and evidence 
which don't exist, the absence of which demonstrate that the Division failed to comply with 
and follow the dissolution statute when it administratively suspended and then dissolved Bio-
Thrust, the corporate dissolution of Bio-Thrust was illegal and unlawful and should be 
judicially set aside. 
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POINT II 
IF THE DIVISION IS CORRECT, NO ONE COULD EVER CHALLENGE 
THE ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION 
A. The Division Has No Valid Argument As To Why Bio-Thrust Lacks Standing 
To Appeal Its Own Death Warrant And Otherwise Seek Judicial Reinstatement. 
The Division's overall argument on appeal is simple and straightforward: "[A] 
dissolved corporation is without authority to engage in any activity other than winding up its 
business affairs and liquidating its assets, if any." Opp. Brief, p. 5, under heading "Summary 
of Argument." In other words, so the argument goes, a Utah corporation is prohibited from 
challenging its unlawful dissolution when that challenge is mounted more than a year after the 
date it was dissolved because it is no longer a corporation that is empowered to do anything 
other than to "wind up" of its affairs. Challenging its unlawful or improper dissolution is not 
a "winding up" of its affairs. 
Contrary to this argument, and as stated in Bio-Thrust's principal brief, 
§ 16-10-88.2(4) of the dissolution statute only provides that dissolution precludes a corporation 
from doing business in its corporate character under any name or any assumed name.1 Suing 
*The full text of this provision of the dissolution statute is as follows: 
The dissolution of any corporation precludes that corporation from doing 
business in its corporate character under any name or assumed name filed on 
behalf of the dissolved corporation under Section 42-2-5. On the date of 
dissolution, the corporation's right in any assumed names it may use is 
suspended. The name of the dissolved corporation and any assumed names 
filed on its behalf are not available for one year from the date of dissolution for 
use by any other domestic corporation, foreign corporation transacting business 
in this state, or person doing business under an assumed name under Section 
42-2-5 
to resurrect and re-legitimize oneself in the eyes of the law is not "doing business" in a 
corporation's "corporate character. See Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 492 (Utah 1996). 
If it were, no one could hold the government accountable for anything. Such argument begs 
the very question in issue in this appeal. Instead of addressing or distinguishing this point, the 
Division ignores it. 
Additionally, the Division argues that there is only one way—and apparently one way 
only—to revive a Utah corporation. And that is by compliance with UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 16-10-88.2(5) (1991), the reinstatement statute in effect in 1991. Opp. Brief, p. 7. This 
may be true for administrative reinstatement but Bio-Thrust and Coombs are seeking judicial 
reinstatement. The Division makes no argument with regard to judicial reinstatement. Yet 
the statute doesn't speak in terms of the courts; it speaks only in terms of administrative 
reinstatement. 
The Division admits on p. 8 of its opposition that the dates that the Division used to 
first suspend and then dissolve Bio-Thrust were incorrect. Its excuse is that these errors were 
de minimus, that is, they allegedly didn't hurt anyone. No harm, no foul. We don't really 
know that that is the case. Their errors certainly may have had a "chilling effect." But what 
is ignored is that these defects violated the express notice requirements of the dissolution 
statute and didn't give Bio-Thrust or its directors and officers the time to cure the alleged 
defects that the legislature determined was necessary to give a Utah citizen. That the 
administrative agency in charge acknowledges the seriousness of these errors is evidenced by 
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the Executive Director of the Dept. of Commerce's Order on Review, p. 2 of Ex. "C" to 
Addendum 2 of Bio-Thrust's principal brief. Therein, the Executive Director orders the 
Division to magically go back and feloniously back-date its records, pretending that the notice 
defects never occurred, conduct which, if undertaken by an individual, might send that 
individual to prison. Here again, the government can boldly undertake and get away with 
something no average citizen would dare try. 
On pp. 10-11 of the Division's Opposition, the Division argues that Holman v. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah App. 1995), is right on point. It is NOT. 
Holman does NOT involve a corporation, one of its officers and directors, and one of its 
shareholders suing to challenge the corporation's alleged unlawful dissolution. Nothing more 
need be said. 
The Division next makes a rather silly argument: It argues that "if corporations could 
engage in business other than winding up their affairs, they could remain essentially 
unregulated, . . . " Opp. Brief, p. 11. We are not talking here about a corporation trying to 
pretend that it is a corporation engaging in business; we are talking about a dissolved 
corporation that is simply seeking to reinstate itself with the proper and lawful authorities, be 
that through the Dept. of Commerce or the judicial branch of government. This is NOT 
engaging "in business" in the sense contemplated by the statute. Bio-Thrust isn't engaging 
in any activity that a member of the public will rely on to his or her detriment, thereby causing 
such person damage or injury. 
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To further argue, as does the Division, that Bio-Thrust and Coombs's efforts "render 
the [dissolution] statute a nullity" is likewise silly. Opp. Brief, p. 11. Bio-Thrust and 
Coombs's lawsuit isn't an application to the Division or the Dept. of Commerce for 
administrative reinstatement. It is instead an effort to obtain judicial reinstatement through 
the courts, not through the specific administrative procedure provided for in the dissolution 
statute. 
Further on, the Division argues that because "other potential plaintiffs have a more 
direct interest in [Bio-Thrust's reinstatement], this Court need not reach the third [standing] 
test" in Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986). Opp. 
Brief at 12. What's curious here is whether the Division means Appellant Coombs in his 
capacity as a director or whether it means Coombs in his capacity as a shareholder is the 
"potential plaintiff having a more direct interest" than Bio-Thrust in the outcome of this 
litigation. If not Coombs in either capacity, then to whom is the Division referring as the 
potential plaintiff having a greater interest in the outcome of the litigation? Is there someone 
out there with a greater interest in this litigation than either Bio-Thrust, one of its officers, 
directors or shareholders? Who then? Let us know so we can bring a lawsuit in the name of 
that person. 
Distilled, the Division's argument is that once a year had gone by, Bio-Thrust was 
forever barred from seeking, in any way and in any forum, to challenge the Division's 
action—even if that action was admittedly wrong, illegal and unlawful and even if the Division 
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failed to give proper notice under the dissolution statute, a fact clearly evidenced by the 
record. No authority is cited for this proposition. Surely this makes no sense. Government 
cannot commit illegal acts and not ever be held accountable for them. This Court should 
therefore reject such argument and its draconian and unjust result. 
B. The Division Has No Valid Argument As To Why Coombs Lacks Standing As 
A Director And Officer Of Bio-Thrust To Seek Judicial Reinstatement Of Bio-Thrust On Its 
Behalf. 
The Division's argues that Coombs lacks standing as a director or officer because, for 
no other or better reason, he was allegedly unlawfully appointed to its board. This is because 
Bio-Thrust was dissolved at the time he was appointed and post-dissolution Bio-Thrust, 
according to the Division, only has the legal right to "wind up its business affairs and liquidate 
its assets." It has no power to appoint Coombs to its board of directors for the purpose of 
taking action to challenge Bio-Thrust's unlawful dissolution—something the previous board 
of directors, for whatever reasons, was unwilling to do. This is identical to the "winding up" 
argument we saw earlier.2 Going further, the Division argues that Coombs lacks standing as 
a director because "[h]e makes no claim that he held an official position at the time of 
dissolution that would have entitled him to bring action on Bio-Thrust's behalf." Opp. Brief, 
p. 6. Does this argument mean that had Coombs been a director of Bio-Thrust in 1990 or 
2The applicable provision of the dissolution statute (quoted in the previous footnote) 
does not say that a dissolved corporation can only engage in the "winding up" of its affairs. 
What it says is that a dissolved corporation is prohibited from "doing business in its corporate 
character." Bio-Thrust and Coombs submit that challenging Bio-Thrust's alleged unlawful 
dissolution is NOT "doing business in its corporate character." Instead, it is doing just what 
it is doing, which is challenging its dissolution. 
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1991, the Division would have conceded standing on his part to challenge Bio-Thrust's 
unlawful dissolution? If so, would it cure the Division's complaints here if Coombs 
substituted himself with an individual who was an officer or director in 1990 or 1991? 
The Division next grasps upon some highly technical arguments: Coombs lacks 
standing to seek reinstatement as a director [or officer] of Bio-Thrust because (1) the minutes 
by which he and a colleague were appointed to the board provide that their doing so was for 
the express purpose of resurrecting Bio-Thrust, not the "winding up" of its corporate affairs, 
and (2) only Coombs and his colleague took positions on the board, that is, two persons, not 
three, all as allegedly prohibited by Utah law. Opp. Brief, 17. This argument has been raised 
for the first time on appeal. Nowhere will this Court find it in the record. But even if it had 
been raised below, suing the Division all in order to challenge government's wrongful 
suspension and dissolution isn't "doing business," all as argued in the previous point above. 
Having said this, however, the purpose of obtaining the resignations of prior directors and 
appointing Coombs and his colleague to the board of Bio-Thrust was to ensure that both had 
control of Bio-Thrust if in fact they were able to reinstate it. It would make no sense to go 
to the trouble and expense of reinstating Bio-Thrust and not be in a position to control the 
board of directors or the company after that event. At the same time, Bio-Thrust and Coombs 
do not believe that it is legally necessary that before every corporation brings a lawsuit, that 
a formal, unanimous consent resolution of directors authorizing the lawsuit be obtained. 
Nowhere is such a requirement under the Revised Utah Corporations Act or otherwise. The 
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fact is that Bio-Thrust currently has a vacancy on its board. Had Coombs and his colleague 
filled that vacancy, they would still be criticized by the Division for taking action that wasn't 
an alleged "winding up" of the corporation's affairs. 
Because the Division's argument doesn't address the simple issue of why a director or 
officer of a corporation would lack standing to bring an action on behalf of the corporation, 
the Division's has no counter-argument on this issue. 
C. The Division Has No Valid Argument As To Why Coombs Lacks Standing As 
A Shareholder Of Bio-Thrust To Seek Judicial Reinstatement Of Bio-Thrust On Its Behalf. 
The Division's argument as to why Coombs lacks standing as a shareholder is an 
inapplicable third party standing argument. See Opp. Brief, p. 6 ("[Coombs's] capacity as 
a shareholder at the relevant time does not confer standing on him to sue for any wrong 
allegedly done to the corporation by a third party.") Such a situation is inapplicable simply 
because Coombs is seeking to step into Bio-Thrust's shoes and sue for reinstatement on its 
behalf, not his. [Emphasis in italics added.] Coombs isn't seeking money damages from a 
third party such as the Division because of what the Division allegedly did to Bio-Thrust. As 
repeatedly stated in the record, Bio-Thrust has no damages claim in the Petition/Complaint. 
But if Coombs would have had standing had he been a director or officer of Bio-Thrust in 
1990 or 1991—something the Division implies in its Summary of Argument—why wouldn't 
he have standing if he were a shareholder in 1990 or 1991—which he was? 
The Division's response to Coombs's shareholder argument ignores that under 
derivative action principles, once the corporation or its board won't act—which is what this 
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case is all about—a shareholder does indeed have standing to act on the corporation's behalf. 
See Rule 23.1, Utah R. Civ. Pro.; see also footnote 16 to Bio-Thrust and Coombs's principal 
brief, p. 44 thereof, citing Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 897 (Utah 
App. 1995) (officers and directors do and can have standing to pursue legal remedies on behalf 
of a corporation and in the context of a corporate dissolution). 
Contrary to what the Division would have one believe, this is not a case like 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993), for example, in which 
an individual attempted to sue a third party over an agreement to which she was not a 
beneficiary and with whom she had no contractual arrangement, the breach of which she 
claimed caused her damage. Such is the typical third party situation in which there is no 
standing. By sharp contrast, however, this case is in a corporate setting in which the 
corporation and its former board's unwillingness to act necessarily gives a shareholder 
standing. See again Rule 23.1, Utah R. Civ. Pro. The Division dodges this issue wholesale 
in is opposing brief. No effort is made to cite or distinguish Rule 23.1, much less the concept 
of a derivative action. 
The Division contends that "stock ownership does not authorize the shareholder to sue 
as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation." Opp. Brief, p. 14. 
Yet if one looks at the individual damages claims that Coombs makes on his own and in his 
individual capacity in the Petition/Complaint, the corporation itself could not make those 
claims—and hasn't. In this regard, the Division's opposition fails to distinguish or address 
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the exception carved out in Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 3 P.2d 722 
(Utah App. 2000). See p. 44 of Bio-Thrust and Coombs's principal brief. This exception 
applies in the context of Coombs's individual claims, claims that are irrelevant to judicial 
reinstatement of Bio-Thrust. Thus, why the Division brings up the argument of Coombs's 
standing on his own behalf is difficult to understand, particularly when the Division has 
ignored Bio-Thrust and Coombs's entire Point II in their principal brief. 
The Division distinguishes Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F.Supp. 406 (D. Utah 1988), on 
the ground that while the shareholder in that case was held to have standing, there was 
allegedly no injury to the corporation itself. This is not true. The shareholder in Lochhead 
alleged fraudulent dilution of his stockholder interest and that that act damaged him 
individually. This means that adequate consideration was not given the corporation for shares 
that it issued to others. Naturally, if this were true, that is, if the corporation were indeed 
issued stock without the receipt of adequate consideration, naturally the corporation would 
have been injured. 
As to East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993), Bio-Thrust 
and Coombs merely cited that case for the proposition that a corporation can authorize or give 
a shareholder consent to bring a claim on its behalf if it wants. That's what Bio-Thrust has 
arguably done here, particularly when it doesn't have the money or other resources to finance 
the litigation itself. It has allowed another to bring the reinstatement portion of the action in 
its name. 
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Finally, the Division argues that Bio-Thrust and Coombs don't have standing under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-15(l)(a) because this contention is raised for the first time on 
appeal and the contention is otherwise not adequately briefed. Opp. Brief, p. 18-19. This is 
wrong. This contention is contained in the record below inasmuch as it is plainly alleged in 
the Jurisdictional section of the Petition/Complaint below. See f 6, Petition/Complaint, 
Addendum 2, Brief of Appellants. This argument is also self-evident from the Order on 
Review itself. The fact is that neither the Division nor the Department of Commerce ever 
raised standing as an issue in the administrative adjudicative proceedings. Put another way, 
the Division did not reinstate Bio-Thrust because standing was lacking; it elected not to 
reinstate Bio-Thrust because it didn't believe it had the power or other authority under the 
dissolution statute to reinstate Bio-Thrust after one year and also because the error it admitted 
that it committed did not justify, in its view, the reinstatement of Bio-Thrust even if it did have 
such power or other authority. See Ex. "C" to Petition/Complaint, Addendum 2, Brief of 
Appellants. 
Based on the foregoing, Coombs has standing as a shareholder to sue the Division on 
behalf of Bio-Thrust in the context of asserting a right belonging to Bio-Thrust that it and its 
previous management failed to assert. Coombs also has standing in his own right to assert the 
individual claims he makes in the Petition/Complaint under the exception carved out in Stocks 
and also on the basis of Lochhead v. Alacano. 
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POINT III 
THE DIVISION FAILS TO DISTINGUISH BIO-THRUST AND 
COOMBS'S POINT THAT THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS 
IS INAPPLICABLE. FURTHER, THE DIVISION APPEARS TO 
ARGUE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LACHES DEFENSE, 
ARGUMENTS NEVER RAISED BEFORE. 
The Division argues that while Bio-Thrust and Coombs sought to rely on the equitable 
powers of the judiciary to reinstate Bio-Thrust, equity is not available because they have 
"unclean hands." Opp. Brief, pp. 19-20. In doing so, however, the Division abjectly fails 
to distinguish or address the fact that for the doctrine of unclean hands to apply, there must 
be detrimental reliance of some kind on the part of the Division. See, e.g., Point III, A, Bio-
Thrust and Coombs' Brief, pp. 38-39. The doctrine of unclean hands having been the basis 
for the lower court's decision and the Division's failure to address it being such a glaring 
deficiency in the Division's opposition, one can only assume that it is intentional—that it is 
in fact a point that the Division concedes. 
The Division also seems to imply that a statute of limitations or laches defense justifies 
the lower court's failure to reinstate Bio-Thrust but no authority is cited for either proposition 
and nowhere did the lower court make such a ruling. Further, nowhere does such an 
argument exist in the record below. 
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POINT IV 
THE DIVISION IGNORES MANY PRINCIPAL POINTS AND 
ARGUMENTS RAISED BY BIO-THRUST AND COOMBS 
The Division argues that Bio-Thrust and Coombs have never contended that Bio-Thrust 
never received the notices of deficiency, suspension and dissolution. Effectively, they have. 
In their motion for partial summary judgment below, Bio-Thrust and Coombs squarely put into 
issue the fact that the Division never sent out the notices properly—or at all. The Division 
never rebutted these contentions. Or, if it did, the Berg affidavit should have been stricken, 
a motion the lower court erroneously ignored. In sum, the Division wholeheartedly ignores 
Point I of Bio-Thrust and Coombs's principal brief, namely, the argument that the trial court 
erred in not granting Bio-Thrust and Coombs their motion for partial summary judgment. 
Finally, the Division's opposition completely ignores Point II of the Appellants' 
principal brief below, namely, the argument that the lower court erred in dismissing the entire 
Petition/Complaint below and all its 19 claims and causes of action under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
R. Civ. Pro. 
CONCLUSION 
The Division's argues that once a year had gone by after dissolution, Bio-Thrust was 
forever barred from seeking, in any way and in any forum, to challenge such dissolution 
action—even if that governmental action was admittedly wrong, illegal and unlawful and even 
if the Division failed to give proper notice under the dissolution statute (as evidenced by the 
record). While this may be true in the Division's own administrative forum, there is a huge 
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difference between administrative reinstatement pursuant to the dissolution statute, on the one 
hand, and judicial reinstatement, on the other, based on legal and equitable principles 
recognized by our courts. The Division's opposition refuses to appreciate or acknowledge this 
important distinction. This is the opposition's failure and its fallacy. To be sure, other than 
trumpeting the lower court's reliance on the unclean hands doctrine, the Division makes no 
effort to distinguish authorities cited by Bio-Thrust and Coombs showing that the doctrine is 
inapplicable. If the doctrine doesn't apply, which it doesn't, then no basis exists for the lower 
court not to have granted Bio-Thrust and Coombs the equitable relief they sought. 
The additional fallacy of the Division's opposition is that a corporation's appeal of its 
own death warrant is somehow "doing business in its corporate character," something it is 
prohibited from doing because it is dissolved. It is difficult to understand how suing the 
government in order to allow you to "do business" is, at the same time, "doing business." 
This is like an argument that a man on death row can't appeal his own death sentence because 
he has to be innocent to appeal his death sentence and the man must not be innocent because 
he's in prison and was convicted of the crime for which he will be executed. It is a circular 
argument. 
To a large extent, this is an evidence case, a summary judgment case. Bio-Thrust and 
Coombs put on evidence in the form of a partial summary judgment motion that the Division 
failed to lawfully declare delinquent, suspend and then dissolve Bio-Thrust. Bio-Thrust and 
Coombs carried that burden with the Division's own official file of Bio-Thrust—a file 
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containing absolutely nothing dated after 1989. The Division then failed to come forward with 
any admissible evidence rebutting the presumption that it failed to comply with the dissolution 
statute and that it thus suspended and then dissolved Bio-Thrust unlawfully and illegally. We 
can only conclude, as a matter of law, that it did. We know nothing else and have no basis 
to believe or conclude otherwise. 
Because we know that Bio-Thrust was dissolved illegally and unlawfully, the question 
for this Court is: What is the remedy? Is there a judicial remedy here? Bio-Thrust and 
Coombs submit that the necessary remedy is to reinstate Bio-Thrust and let the Division 
commence dissolution procedures all over again in a proper and lawful manner. 
Finally, the Division asserts an argument that flies in the face of all concepts of justice 
and fairness: If neither Bio-Thrust nor one of its officers, directors or shareholders have 
standing to challenge its illegal and unlawful dissolution then no one anywhere would ever 
have standing to judicially challenge the unlawful dissolution of any corporation. Does this 
make sense? Should government be allowed to be so absolutely unaccountable? Are our 
courts somehow off limits when an administrative agency has violated the law and not acted 
within the bounds of its authority? Can a government agency just do what it wants with 
impunity and there is no judicial remedy after one year? This is the crux of the Division's 
opposition. 
Standing can be an excuse for a court to avoid making an important and hard decision 
that it should. Bio-Thrust and Coombs hope that this is not such a case. 
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DATED this day of March, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MABEY& COOMBS, L.C. 
Jcftin Michael Coombs 
Attorneys for Appellants Bio-Thrust and 
Coombs 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
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delivered two (2) copies of this REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to: 
Nancy Kemp, Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 ^ 
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